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Università di Torino 
This paper shows that when a product innovation is protected by both patents and trade secrets, under  
U.S. law the innovator can be induced to license a rival even if patent protection is very broad and there 
are no partially competitive older products. This opportunity may benefit society. Nevertheless, some 
legal restrictions in force at the moment do not permit society to reap all potential gains. Since incentive 
and efficiency considerations suggest that a socially optimal contract should provide for both a negative 
fixed fee and post-patent royalties at the same unit level as before a patent’s expiration, we conclude 
that per se prohibitions of these practices are unjustified. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In an oft-cited decision − Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) − the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated that a patentee’s use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the 
expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se, on the ground that to collect 
such royalties was to extend the monopoly of the patent to inventions that are 
properly in the public domain. The license involved in the case was limited to 
patents, and the royalty rate, which was based on the licensee’s use of a 
patented machine, was the same both before and after the patent expired 
(Cohen and Gutterman, 1998). 
Charging royalties over a period that exceeds the legal term of patent protection 
is in any case a lawful practice in hybrid licensing agreements − that is, when 
licenses tie patents to some other intellectual property rights such as trademarks 
or trade secrets (which have no fixed expiration). But since courts presume that, 
as a rule, in these hybrid licensing agreements patents are inherently more 
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valuable than tied intellectual property rights, contracts must provide for 
appropriate decreases in the royalty rates when patents terminate. The result is 
that it is de facto impossible to subscribe an enforceable contract providing for 
unchanged royalties after patent expiration: consistent with Brulotte, such a clause 
would be invalidated as an unfair attempt by the licensor to use the patent as 
leverage into the post-expiration market. 
From an economics perspective, the reasoning underlying the decision in 
Brulotte has been roundly criticized by, among others, Gilbert and Shapiro (1997) 
and Judge Posner in Scheiber v. Dolby Labs, 293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002).1 Their 
counter-argument is that, since the patentee can in no way extract royalties 
above the value of the innovation, post-expiration royalties do not extend the 
patent duration either technically or practically: as far as market power is 
concerned, it is a detail whether the patentee extracts royalties at a higher rate 
over a shorter period of time or at a lower rate over a longer period of time.2 
Moreover, permitting royalties to be paid over a longer period can reduce the 
deadweight loss from the patent monopoly (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990). 
Successively, Law (2004) built a model of hybrid licensing, where in an initially 
duopolistic market the proprietor of a process innovation, who is not a 
producer of the final good, is considering the prospect of licensing one or both 
of the producing duopolists. In this context, hybrid licensing can enhance 
efficiency for non-drastic innovations.3 
But what can be said about a situation in which a new product enters the 
market and the innovator is a producer of the final good? The paper addresses 
this issue under the further hypotheses that the product innovation is drastic, 
i.e. no one would buy a possible older product (Gilbert, 2006), and the patent is 
very broad, in the sense that the costs of inventing a non-infringing imitation 
are greater than duopoly profits (Gallini, 1992). 
In analyzing optimal patent design with costly imitation, Gallini (1992) finds 
that broad patents, with patent life adjusted to generate the desired return from 
research, are socially efficient in that they limit socially wasteful imitation costs. 
This result has been questioned on the ground that imitation costs can be 
                                                
1 See also Bowman (1973), Ayres and Klemperer (1999), Landes and Posner (2003), U.S. 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2007), and Devlin (2008). While labelling 
Justice Douglas’ majority opinion as careless, Baxter (1966) argues that a prohibition against 
extending royalty payments beyond the patent life is justified. 
2 In the Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements 
issued in 2004, the European Commission adopted this point of view. See the concluding remark 
in Section 4 below. 
3 A process innovation traditionally is said to be drastic (non-drastic) if the monopoly price 
with the new technology is below (above) the unit cost with the old technology.  
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avoided through patent licensing (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2002): if entry by imitation 
constitutes a credible threat because non-infringing imitations can be obtained 
at positive but not prohibitive costs, the patent holder will be induced to 
license. If so, optimality requires long-lived, narrow patents; that is, imitation 
costs have to be very low, whereas the incentive to innovate is preserved 
through an adequate prolongation of the patent life.4 
Our paper shows that when a product innovation is protected by both 
patents and trade secrets, under U.S. law the producer-innovator may find it in 
her interest to license a rival even if patent protection is very broad and there 
are no partially competitive older products.5 Such hybrid licensing agreements, 
which extend royalty payments beyond the expiration date of the patent, 
improve consumer’s welfare with respect to the temporary monopoly 
alternative (like narrow, long-lived patents in the case of pure patent licensing). 
Nevertheless, since consumer’s benefits are at a maximum when the royalty 
level is the same both before and after patent’s expiration, not all opportunities 
are currently exploited: court decisions that invalidate hybrid licensing 
contracts with non-decreasing royalties do not permit society to reap all of the 
potential gains from these agreements. 
Moreover, we show that in order to induce the innovator to strictly prefer a 
hybrid licensing agreement, although acceptable by the entrant, limited side 
payments (negative fixed fees) should be envisaged. This raises another matter, 
this time involving antitrust concerns about side payment agreements: since, in 
general, such agreements impose a cap on the entrant’s output, thus reducing 
competition, they are likely to be illegal under the antitrust laws. Nevertheless, 
as we will see, in a hybrid licensing context it may be socially efficient to permit 
limited negative fees. 
Section 2 contains a discussion of some legal aspects about royalty terms. In 
Section 3 the model is discussed and the results on efficiency and feasibility of 
hybrid licensing agreements are presented. Section 4 concludes. 
2. ROYALTY TERMS  
The issue of the permissible royalty term has arisen in three distinct contexts: 
pure patent licensing, pure secret licensing, and hybrid patent-secret licensing 
agreements. 
                                                
4 The literature on optimal patents is very large. A selection of the first contributions includes 
Tandon (1982), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer (1990), Gallini (1992), and Denicolò (1996). 
5 Our model does not address the question of patentee’s optimal choice of the patent-secret 
mix. This sort of choice is studied in Ottoz and Cugno (2008) where, however, licensing effects 
are not explicitly considered. 
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Pure patent licensing. When the subject matter of a license agreement is 
protected purely by patent law, the reference decision is that of the 
Supreme Court in Brulotte v. Thys Co. 379 U.S. 29 (1964). As summarized 
in Judge Berzon’s opinion in Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell 502 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 
2007), “...the case involved various patents held by the Thys Company, 
which sold farmers a hop-picking machine for a flat sum but required 
them to purchase a license for the patents on the machines in order to 
use the product. The license contract demanded that, in addition to the 
initial purchase price of the machines and onerous restrictions on their 
assignment or use, the farmers pay the larger of a $500 annual royalty or 
a set royalty rate tied to the amount of hops they harvested each year. 
The last patent incorporated into the machines expired in 1957. When 
the farmers subsequently refused to pay the royalty, the Thys Company 
sued to enforce the licensing contract.” 
The Supreme Court invalidated the license agreement as “a bald attempt to exact 
the same terms and conditions for the period after the patents have expired as 
they do for the monopoly period.”
 
While conceding that “…a patent empowers 
the owner to extract royalties as high as he can negotiate with the leverage of his 
monopoly,” the Court deemed it unacceptable to use that same leverage to 
impose royalty payments for a time extending beyond the patent life. The Court 
considered the extension of the royalty obligation beyond the patent life as a sort 
of tying arrangement, whereby a monopolist uses its power in one market to 
assert itself in another market: a patentee which enjoys a monopoly in the pre-
expiration market cannot use that monopoly as leverage into the post-expiration 
market (Koenig, 2003).
 
As a result, the Court concluded that a patentee’s use of a 
royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is 
unlawful per se, and held the licensee’s royalty obligation unenforceable. 
The economic reasoning in Brulotte has been recently challenged by Court of 
Appeals Judge Richard Posner in his decision on Scheiber v. Dolby, Inc., 293 F.3d 
1014 (7th Cir. 2002) on the ground that “The duration of the patent fixes the 
limit of the patentee's power to extract royalties; it is a detail whether he 
extracts them at a higher rate over a shorter period of time or a lower rate over 
a longer period of time.” Judge Posner reluctantly applied the Brulotte rule to 
the case at hand, but invited the Supreme Court to overrule it. However, the 
Supreme Court declined to review the decision in Scheiber. 
Pure secret licensing. In the case of pure secret licensing, challenges to the 
agreement are often brought by the licensee after the trade secret has 
become publicly available. 
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According to the decision in Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1373 
(11th Cir. 1983), the validity of the royalty term of a pure secret license is 
merely a matter of contract law − that is, any term freely negotiated by the 
licensor and licensee is enforceable. If the parties do not stipulate when royalty 
payments should terminate, the court will not establish such a term but will 
enforce the obligation as long as the licensee uses the trade secret (Miller, 1989). 
Warner-Lambert v. John F. Reynolds, Inc, 178 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) is the 
classic reference case in this area. In 1881, the discoverer of the secret formula 
for Listerine antiseptic granted Warner-Lambert's predecessor the exclusive 
commercial use of the formula in exchange for a royalty obligation. The 
contract contained no date of termination. After seventy-five years, Warner-
Lambert filed a declaratory judgment action to terminate the royalty payments 
on the ground that the Listerine formula had become public knowledge since 
1931, when it had been published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association. The court ruled in favor of the defendant, holding that, contrary to 
the case of royalty agreements involving patents, there was no public interest in 
preventing enforcement of a royalty obligation when the licensed trade secret 
becomes publicly available. The court noted that Warner-Lambert, acquiring 
the secret formula subject to the risk of disclosure, won and maintained a 
dominant position in the antiseptic market through the years. Thus, the 
plaintiff's obligation was intended to continue until it ceased to manufacture or 
sell Listerine, whether or not the formula was disclosed. 
Hybrid licensing. When a license agreement involves a technology with 
both patented and unpatented parts, at the expiration of the patent the 
licensee often suspends royalty payments, while the licensor claims that 
know-how protected by trade secret supports the royalty obligation after 
the patents have expired. If the agreement does not clearly differentiate 
between patents and trade secrets by providing a separate royalty for 
each, then courts usually decide in favour of the licensee on the basis 
that a hybrid license cannot be used to extend the patent monopoly in 
contradiction of Brulotte (e.g., Chromalloy American Corp. v. Fischmann, 716 
F.2d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
This point is clarified in Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1373 (11th 
Cir. 1983). The case concerned a licensing contract for a paper-collating machine 
in which the licensee agreed to pay royalties to the inventor for the right to 
manufacture and market the machine. In examining the case, “…the district 
court agreed with Mestre and Pitney Bowes that the agreement licensed both 
patent rights and trade secrets and thus was a ‘hybrid’ agreement.” Despite this 
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finding, the district court concluded that, based on Brulotte, the agreement expired 
when the last patent on the machine expired (Gates and Maier, 2009). 
On appeal, the licensor contended “…that the district court should not have 
applied Brulotte and that Brulotte is distinguishable on the ground that the royalty 
payments in that case were solely for patent rights,” while the agreement in 
question licensed both patent rights and trade secrets. The court rejected this 
claim on the ground that, first, as in Brulotte, “…the exclusive rights granted 
under the license agreement applied equally before and after the patents’ 
expiration” and, second, the agreement required the licensee “…to pay 
royalties at the same rate and on the same basis after the patents expired that it 
paid while the patent was in effect.” Nevertheless, citing Brulotte, the court 
observes that “…if a patent owner can prove that he did not use his patent 
monopoly leverage to exact reduced post-expiration trade secret payments…” 
then a hybrid licensing agreement that provides for a step-down in royalty rate 
after the patent expires would be enforceable. 
As Gates and Maier (2009) point out, following Pitney Bowes other courts have 
continued to hold that hybrid licensing agreements providing for “level royalties” 
− that is, royalties which do not diminish after patent’s expiration − are 
unenforceable.6 Thus, hybrid licenses should include provisions that separate 
royalties from different intellectual property rights − such as royalties from patents 
and those from the use of trade secrets − and eliminate royalties from patents that 
expire or are invalidated − which stand for the proposition that royalties should 
not be due on patents upon expiration or invalidation (Jones et al., 2007).  
3. HYBRID LICENSING VS. TEMPORARY 
MONOPOLY EXPLOITATION 
In this section we present a simple model where a proprietary product is 
protected by both patent and trade secret. First, we show that even if the 
patent is very broad, the technology holder may be indifferent between 
temporarily exploiting monopoly power and licensing to a rival the entire 
technology from the outset through a hybrid license. The second option would 
be better for consumers and thus socially superior. Then, we point out that if 
limited negative fixed fees are allowed, a feasible hybrid licensing agreement 
that benefits consumers may become the technology holder’s preferred choice.  
                                                
6 See, e.g., Boggild v. Kenner Products, 776 F.2d 1315 (6th Cir.1985); Baladvon Inc. v Abbott Labs., 
871 F. Supp. 89, 97 (D Mass. 1994); Sanford Redmond, Inc. v Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 29 USPQ 
2d (BNA) 1222, 1226 (SDNY 1992). 
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3.1. THE MODEL 
Let’s consider a firm able to produce a new good by utilizing a technology 
jointly protected by patent and trade secret. By assumption, a trade secret 
extends beyond the statutory life of the patent, which is meant to have 
maximum breadth, so that imitation is necessarily infringing. 
There is only one potential entrant who, when the patent expires, can enter 
the market bearing a fixed cost of independent invention of the secret or 
through a license. (We will consider the case of numerous potential entrants in 
Subsection 3.4 below.) The purchase of the license is preferred if the royalty 
per unit of product set in the contract is not higher than sρ . A third 
opportunity is that the two firms agree from the outset on a hybrid license 
allowing the immediate entry of the licensee, despite the maximum patent’s 
breadth, conditional on the payment of a royalty per unit output pρ  during the 
patent life and a subsequent royalty sρ  after patent’s expiration. 
The price of the good and the quantity produced are respectively P  and X  
and the inverse demand function is XaP −= . Let’s assume then that unit 
production cost is constant and set equal to zero. The two firms compete à la 
Cournot − that is, each firm chooses a quantity to produce that maximizes its 
profits, given an equilibrium expectation about the other firm’s output. Then, 
calling 
A
pX  and 
A
sX  the production flows of the proprietary firm before and 
after patent’s expiration, and 
B
pX  and 
B
sX  the production flows of the 
entrant firm, in the case of a hybrid license we have 
(1)     spiaPaXaX iiiBiiAi ,,3,3
2
,
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=
−
=
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=
ρρρ
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A
iX ’s values maximize the profit flows 
B
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A
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A
i XXP ρ+=Π  given 
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B
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B
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B
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B
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A
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A
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while the flows of consumer’s surplus, 2/))(( BiAiii XXPaCS +−= , is given by 
(3)     spiaCS ii ,,3
2
2
1 2
=




 −=
ρ
. 
Let’s now indicate with τ  the patent’s length and suppose, without loss of 
generality, that secret duration is infinite. Then, setting τreT −−= 1 , where r  
is the discount rate, by using equation (2) we can write the present values of the 
two firms’ profits as 
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Next, from equation (3) we obtain the present value of consumer’s surplus, 
that is 
(6)     
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3.2. SOCIAL EFFICIENCY 
Equations (4), (5) and (6) encompass the case of entry of the rival firm after 
patent’s expiration by the means of a pure secret license. This case is obtained by 
setting 2/ap =ρ  (implying 0=BpX ) and ss ρρ = .7 Thus, if 
AV  and BV  
stand for the present values of the two firms’ profits under pure secret licensing, 
(7)     




 −
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



 +−
+




=
3
2
3
1
2
22
s
s
sA aa
r
Ta
r
TV ρρρ , 
                                                
7 Obviously, 0=BpX  for all 2/ap ≥ρ . 
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(8)     
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Analogously, if W  stands for the present value of consumer’s surplus, 
(9)     
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By comparing equations (4) and (5) with equations (7) and (8), we can now 
show that there exists a set of hybrid licensing agreements, each characterized by 
a pair of royalty rates ),( sp ρρ , which leave the two firms with the same present 
values of profits as a pure secret license released after the patent’s expiration. 
 
Proposition 1. There exists a set of pairs ),( sρ p ρ  such that a hybrid license is 
equally profitable for both firms as a pure secret license. 
Proof. By setting BB VV =  (equations (5) and (8)), we have 
(10)     






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
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
 −−
=




 − 22
2
33
21
3
2
ssp aa
T
Ta ρρρ
. 
This equation gives us the pairs ),( sp ρρ  that make hybrid licensing as 
profitable as pure secret licensing for the entrant firm. Solving for pρ , 
(11)     ])2()2[(1
2
1
2
22
ssp aaT
Ta
ρρρ −−−
−
±= . 
The pairs ),( sp ρρ  associated with the positive sign have to be 
discarded because in this case 2/ap >ρ  for ss ρρ > , a meaningless 
result in this context. Thus, if we indicate with )ˆ,ˆ( sp ρρ  the pairs 
),( sp ρρ  having the required property, we can write 
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(12)     ])ˆ2()2[(1
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Analogously, by setting AA VV =  (equations (4) and (7)), we have 
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from which we obtain the pairs ),( sp ρρ  that make hybrid licensing as 
profitable as pure secret licensing for the technology proprietor firm. By 
solving for pρ  we again obtain equation (11). 
Summing up, all hybrid licensing agreements that respect condition (12) 
are equally profitable for both firms and are equally profitable as 
compared to a pure secret license. □ 
 
We now see the effects on consumer’s surplus. By operating on equations (6) 
and (12) we can show that each hybrid licensing agreement characterized by a 
pair )ˆ,ˆ( sp ρρ  implies a present value of the consumer’s surplus higher than 
that associated with a pure secret licensing agreement. 
 
Proposition 2. A hybrid license implying the same profitability as a pure secret 
license is preferable for consumers. 
Proof. Let us set pp ρρ ˆ=  and ss ρρ ˆ= . Then, differentiating 
consumer’s surplus in equation (6) and the condition of equal 
profitability in equation (12), both with respect to 
ss ρρ ˆ= , we obtain 
(14)   ,
ˆ2
ˆ21
ˆ
ˆ
,
9
ˆ21
ˆ
ˆ
9
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ˆ p
s
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that is, by substituting, 
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(15)     )ˆ2(9
)ˆ2)(ˆ2()ˆ2)(ˆ2(1
ˆ p
pssp
s a
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ρρρρ
ρ −
−−−−−−
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Now, it is easy to verify that 
sp ρρ ˆˆ ≥  implies 0ˆ/ ≥sddW ρ . Hence 
starting from a situation where 
ss ρρ =  and 2/ap =ρ  (pure secret 
license), it is possible to increase consumer’s surplus without reducing 
firms’ profitability, by shifting to a hybrid license, implying a reduction in 
pρ  coupled with an adequate increase in sρ . □ 
 
Since 0ˆ/ >sddW ρ  as long as sp ρρ ˆˆ > , it immediately follows that a hybrid 
license implying 
sp ρρ ˆˆ =  maximizes consumer’s surplus subject to 
AA VV =  
and BB VV = . Then, the following proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 3. The legal prohibition against entering a hybrid licensing agreement 
providing for the same royalty before and after patent’s expiration is socially 
inefficient. 
 
Anyway, as asserted in Proposition 2, in our model hybrid licensing agreements 
improve social welfare even if per unit royalties must decline after patent 
expiration. This welfare improvement is due to the fact that if hybrid licensing 
agreements were not feasible, the royalties would be 2/ap =ρ  (which would 
imply monopolistic exploitation of the patent) and 
ss ρρ = , while hybrid licenses 
permit a lesser difference between pρ  and sρ , and this smoothing favours 
consumers. In other words, allowing for the immediate entry of the rival firm in 
spite of the drastic nature of the innovation, hybrid licensing during the patent life 
benefits consumers more than it will damage them successively. 
3.3. INCENTIVES TO ADOPT HYBRID LICENSING 
Thus far we have seen that the present value of consumer’s surplus is higher if 
royalties Pρ  and sρ  are chosen according to condition (12), as compared to the 
case of a pure secret license, while the present values of profits accruing to both 
the innovator and the entrant remain unaltered. Obviously, this means that the 
innovator will be indifferent between offering a hybrid license from the outset 
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and offering a pure secret license in the future while retaining the monopoly 
privilege during the patent life. That is, in this case the innovator has no 
compelling reason to offer a hybrid license. The following proposition shows 
how the possibility of including in the contract a clause providing for a side 
payment would induce the licensor to strictly prefer hybrid licensing. If this side 
payment is limited, consumers continue to benefit from the agreement. 
 
Proposition 4. If licensing agreements providing for negative fixed fees are feasible, 
it is possible to obtain, in comparison with a pure secret license, an increase in the 
present value of both consumer’s surplus and licensor’s profits. 
Proof. By setting WW =  (equations (6) and (9)), we have 
(16)     
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T
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, 
from which we can obtain the pairs )~,~( sp ρρ  leaving consumers 
indifferent between a hybrid license and a pure secret license, given by8 
(17)     ])~2()2[(149
2
12~ 222 ssp aaT
T
aa ρρρ −−−
−
+−= . 
Let us set pp ρρ
~=  and ss ρρ
~=  in equation (4). Then, differentiating 
licensor’s profits in equation (4) and the condition in equation (17), both 
with respect to 
sρ
~ , we have 
(18)  
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that is 
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8 As for the case in Proposition 1, the pairs ),( sp ρρ  associated with a positive sign have to 
be discarded. 
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At this point, we can easily verify that 
sp ρρ
~~ >  implies 0~/ >s
A ddV ρ . 
Thus, starting from a situation where 
ss ρρ =  and 2/ap =ρ  (pure 
secret license), it is possible to increase licensor’s profits without reducing 
consumer’s surplus by shifting to a hybrid license, implying a reduction in 
pρ  coupled with an adequate increase in sρ . Since a royalty contract 
)~,~( sρ p ρ  increases licensor’s profits with respect to a pure secret license, 
whereas a contract )ˆ,ˆ( sp ρρ  leaves them unchanged, when ss ρρ ˆ~ =  we 
must have pp ρρ ˆ
~ > . 
Let’s then set 
ss ρρ ˆ
~ =  and suppose a pρ  is chosen such that 
ppp ρρρ
~
ˆ << . This licensing agreement implies, as compared to the 
pure secret license, higher present values of consumer’s surplus and 
licensor’s profits and a lower present value of entrant’s profits, which 
represents a violation of the participation constraint. If the benefits to 
the technology proprietor firm outweigh the losses of the entrant, 
however, the participation constraint may be satisfied with a lump-sum 
transfer from the licensor to the licensee. 
Partially differentiating AV  and BV  with respect to pρ , we obtain 
(20)    
9
)2(2
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9
)(2 p
p
Bpp
p
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ρ
ρ
ρρ
ρ
−
−=
∂
∂−
+
+
=
∂
∂ , 
and it is easy to verify that for 2/ap <ρ  we have 
0// >∂∂+∂∂ p
B
p
A VV ρρ , so that the required transfer is feasible. □ 
As has been widely recognized, permitting negative fixed fees in licensing 
contracts can be somewhat dangerous. If side payments of this kind are 
allowed, a licensing contract may become the equivalent of a bribe paid by the 
licensor to induce the potential entrant to stay out of the market (Shapiro, 1985).9 
Outside a patent settlement context in which the parties aim to avoid litigation 
costs for alleged infringement, such a payment would always appear to be 
                                                
9 In our framework, this extreme outcome would be obtained with a contract envisaging royalties 
2/, a
sp ≥ρρ , so that 0==
B
sp X
BX , and a negative fixed fee high enough to compensate the potential 
entrant for giving up entry through independent invention of secrets after patent’s expiration. 
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harmful for consumers and thus blatantly unlawful under the antitrust laws 
(Lemley and Shapiro, 2005): a monopolist is not allowed to pay a potential entrant 
to stay off the market or to pay a rival to reduce its output. On the other hand, 
in a hybrid licensing context-side payments do not necessarily result in anti-
competitive effects. Provided negative fees and royalties per unit output are not 
too high, they can make privately convenient licensing agreements that enhance 
consumers’ welfare. Thus, even outside the patent settlement context, negative 
fixed fees should not be per se illegal under the antitrust law: reasoned case-by-
case decisions seem to be the best course. 
3.4. NUMEROUS POTENTIAL ENTRANTS
The extension to the case of 1>n  identical and identified potential entrants is 
a straightforward exercise which adds nothing relevant to the topic addressed 
in this paper. In effect, in this case the technology proprietor is able to sign 
licenses with all industry participants providing for adequate royalties before 
and after patent expiration. Then, it is easy to show that equations from (10) to 
(15) continue to hold, keeping unaltered our results on both the feasibility and 
efficiency of hybrid licensing.  
If from the very beginning not all potential entrants are identified, however, a 
hybrid licensing agreement may be unfeasible. Since a hybrid license has to fix 
a post-expiration royalty greater than that which reflects the trade secret value, 
hybrid license assignees would take the risk of becoming uncompetitive with 
respect to the as-yet unidentified entrants through pure secret licenses or 
independent invention of secrets. Therefore, our conclusions are limited to the 
case in which the patentee is able to sign licenses with most or all industry 
participants and there are some barriers to entry to prevent new firms from 
taking over the market after the patent expires (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1997). 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper shows that when a product innovation is protected by both patents 
and trade secrets, under the U.S. law the innovator can be induced to license a 
rival even if patent protection is very broad and there are no partially 
competitive older products. These hybrid licensing agreements, which extend 
royalty payments beyond the expiration date of the patent, can benefit 
consumers with respect to the temporary monopoly alternative. Nevertheless, 
not all opportunities are currently exploited. Given innovator’s benefits, 
consumers’ welfare is maximized when the innovator is able to extract the 
same royalty per unit output both before and after patent’s expiration. In turn, 
innovator’s benefits depend on the legal admissibility of licensing agreements 
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providing for (limited) negative fixed fees. Thus, court decisions relative to 
post-patent royalty levels and antitrust concerns about negative fixed fees 
either are not justified on efficiency grounds or, if justified as in the case of 
negative fees, should not lead to a per se prohibition. 
We conclude by noting that, with regard to post-expiration royalties, the EU 
adopted an approach similar to that proposed by Judge Posner. Paragraph 159 
of the Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology 
Transfer Agreements issued by the European Commission (2004) states: 
“Notwithstanding the fact that the block exemption only applies as long as the 
technology is valid and in force, the parties can normally agree to extend 
royalty obligations beyond the period of validity of the licensed intellectual 
property rights without falling foul of Article 81(1). Once these rights expire, 
third parties can legally exploit the technology in question and compete with 
the parties to the agreement. Such actual and potential competition will 
normally suffice to ensure that the obligation in question does not have 
appreciable anti-competitive effects.” Thus, in the EU, patent licensing clauses 
requiring royalty payments beyond the temporal duration of the underlying 
patent could not be considered per se invalid by local courts. In this respect, EU 
regulation seems to favor efficient arrangements more as compared to US law. 
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